They've recently implemented the under 16's ban in Australia.
It failed (& I suspect it was entirely designed to fail) because kids were just falsifying their year of birth (call me cynical, but as if no one could have predicted this).
So “problem/reaction/solution” - now they're moving to the next stage. They've begun the process of the first of the big 4 banks requiring photo ID to be uploaded to every bank account if you want continued access to your own money. If you decline, your online access to your accounts is frozen (perhaps even in-person access at a branch is frozen as well). They're telling customers this is to “prevent money-laundering”.
The “age verification to protect the kids” was the ruse. The real agenda was verified identity tied to your bank account (a digital ID in all but name). Bank-backed ID is planned to integrate fully into the private sector, not just .gov accounts. The video below lays it out well and suggests that in the near future - in addition to existing options like “sign in with Google” or “sign in with Apple” - new options of “sign in with ConnectID” for example will appear, which directly queries your bank account.
In time, it's a given that the Google and Apple options will disappear.
This is all to identify real people and prevent online anonymity. It says much that deceiving the Public is the means by which they choose to get there.
That's the concern many people have. Once age verification becomes the accepted solution, the next question is always: how do you verify age reliably? The answer inevitably becomes identity verification.
What starts as "protecting children" can quickly evolve into proving who you are before accessing services, platforms, and eventually financial systems. The Australian example is particularly interesting because, as you point out, if children can simply enter a different birth year, then the stated objective isn't really achieved. The obvious response from policymakers is then to demand stronger verification.
The pattern critics identify is that each failure becomes the justification for the next layer of identification. First age declarations. Then photo ID. Then verified digital credentials. Then integration with banks, government services, and private-sector platforms.
Whether one agrees with that interpretation or not, it is certainly true that the infrastructure being built today extends far beyond simply blocking children from viewing certain content. Once identity becomes the key to accessing digital services, anonymity becomes increasingly difficult to maintain, and the debate shifts from child protection to the future of privacy itself.
The real question is not whether children should be protected. It is whether the systems created in the name of protecting them remain limited to that purpose, or whether they become the foundation for a much broader digital identity framework.
They've recently implemented the under 16's ban in Australia.
It failed (& I suspect it was entirely designed to fail) because kids were just falsifying their year of birth (call me cynical, but as if no one could have predicted this).
So “problem/reaction/solution” - now they're moving to the next stage. They've begun the process of the first of the big 4 banks requiring photo ID to be uploaded to every bank account if you want continued access to your own money. If you decline, your online access to your accounts is frozen (perhaps even in-person access at a branch is frozen as well). They're telling customers this is to “prevent money-laundering”.
The “age verification to protect the kids” was the ruse. The real agenda was verified identity tied to your bank account (a digital ID in all but name). Bank-backed ID is planned to integrate fully into the private sector, not just .gov accounts. The video below lays it out well and suggests that in the near future - in addition to existing options like “sign in with Google” or “sign in with Apple” - new options of “sign in with ConnectID” for example will appear, which directly queries your bank account.
In time, it's a given that the Google and Apple options will disappear.
This is all to identify real people and prevent online anonymity. It says much that deceiving the Public is the means by which they choose to get there.
https://youtu.be/98Y5KqEw68g?is=QQXE4Kw6FdyXtKa2
That's the concern many people have. Once age verification becomes the accepted solution, the next question is always: how do you verify age reliably? The answer inevitably becomes identity verification.
What starts as "protecting children" can quickly evolve into proving who you are before accessing services, platforms, and eventually financial systems. The Australian example is particularly interesting because, as you point out, if children can simply enter a different birth year, then the stated objective isn't really achieved. The obvious response from policymakers is then to demand stronger verification.
The pattern critics identify is that each failure becomes the justification for the next layer of identification. First age declarations. Then photo ID. Then verified digital credentials. Then integration with banks, government services, and private-sector platforms.
Whether one agrees with that interpretation or not, it is certainly true that the infrastructure being built today extends far beyond simply blocking children from viewing certain content. Once identity becomes the key to accessing digital services, anonymity becomes increasingly difficult to maintain, and the debate shifts from child protection to the future of privacy itself.
The real question is not whether children should be protected. It is whether the systems created in the name of protecting them remain limited to that purpose, or whether they become the foundation for a much broader digital identity framework.